During this period, the war between Croats and Bosniaks ended, with the two factions settling their differences in the Washington Agreement in March 1994. The final agreement is called Plan Vance[22] the Implementation Agreement[14] or the Sarajevo Agreement (Sarajevski sporazum in Croatian). [24] [25] The UN operation was made possible on the assumption that the agreement was not a definitive political solution and by describing the role of the UN mission, which enabled both sides to claim it as a victory. The RSK stated that the situation was due to the continued existence of the RSK authorities until a final political agreement was reached, which virtually ensured that RSK was not incentivised to negotiate. The Croats believed that the UN would return the territory controlled by the RSK to Croatian authority, which the UN would not attempt to do. [26] Despite the Geneva agreement, which requires the immediate withdrawal of JNA personnel and JNA equipment from Croatia, the JNA remained there for an additional seven to eight months. When they finally withdrew, they left their equipment to the RSK forces. [40] The 2 January ceasefire allowed the JNA to maintain its positions in Eastern and Western Slavonia, on the brink of military collapse. [41] Due to organizational problems and violations of the previous ceasefire agreement, UNPRON HAS only arrived on 8 March [35] and took two months to fully deploy in UNEP. Although, until January 1993, UNPRO NEWS deployed most of the RSK`s heavy weapons to storage areas jointly controlled by the UN and RSK,[42] peacekeepers were unable to comply with the provisions of the Vance Plan, such as disarming the RSK militia, returning refugees, re-establishing civilian authority and establishing ethnically mixed police. [43] The RSK army was renamed the police while the ethnic cleansing of the areas it controlled continued unchecked. UNPRO NEWS has been forced to prevent the return of refugees due to poor security. There was no attempt to create an ethnically mixed police force.

[44] UNPRO NEWS also failed to withdraw KSR troops from areas outside UNDP that were under UNDPS control at the time of the signing of the ceasefire agreement. These areas – later better known as „pink areas”[42] should be returned to Croatian control from the outset. [45] The failure of this aspect in the implementation of the Vance Plan has made pink areas a major source of friction between Croatia and the RSK. [46] The Vance Plan was to cease fighting in Croatia and allow negotiations to continue without the effects of continued hostilities. It did not propose any political solutions in advance. The plan called for the 10,000-strong UN Protection Force (UNPROPA) to the three major conflict zones designated as UN Protected Areas (UNPAs). [22] The plan listed some municipalities to be included in each UNPA, but the specific limits of each UNPA were not clearly defined, as several municipalities were to be only partially included. The task of defining the exact limits of each UNPA has been entrusted to the United Nations liaison officers sent in advance, in cooperation with the authorities of each region. [30] The creation of UNPAs was necessary to accept the plan of Miloévié and De Tuerman. The authorities of Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia had initially requested the deployment of a UN force along an area between Serb and Croatian territories, reflecting The Serbian wish that the peacekeeping force provide the lines of confrontation. Croatia wanted the UN force to be deployed along its international borders. UNDP has been used to formally satisfy both parties.

[34] The Vance Plan consisted of two agreements. The first agreement, known as the Geneva Agreement, was signed on 23 November 1991 in Geneva, Switzerland, by Yugoslav Defence Minister General Veljko Kadijevic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tusman.